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“Why, O Lord, do you stand far away? Why do you hide yourself in 
times of trouble?”  
Psalm 10:1, ESV 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Black Death reached its climax in Europe from around 1346-1353. One of its 
salient features is that the Black Death did not seem to care just how pious or good 
its victim was—it afflicted the wicked and the virtuous all the same. The Black 
Death seemed to have little regard for social status or moral or religious character. 
People cried out to God for help and mercy, but God often seemed silent and 
hidden.1  
And many of us have experienced something like this in our own lives. To many of 
us, in times of suffering, God can seem completely hidden. God can seem silent. 
Of course, one of the things we see in these situations is the problem of evil. If God 
is all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing, how can needless evil—including 
suffering of ostensibly innocent (if not good) people—happen? And given that such 
evil does occur, doesn’t that at least cast doubt on the existence of such a God? But 
there is another, related worry lurking in the neighborhood. When God seems so 
silent and hidden—especially in times of tremendous need—this can create what we 
might call the existential problem of divine hiddenness. As Daniel Howard-Snyder 
and Paul Moser note, “The existential problem often takes the form of a crises of 
faith, sometimes leading to a collapse of trust in God” (2002, 1). To be sure, the 
experience of evil is not strictly necessary for the existential problem of divine 
hiddenness—God can seem hidden in benign times or even good times—but the 																																																								1	While	there	are	interesting	debates	to	be	had	regarding	the	nature	and	characteristics	of	God,	in	this	chapter	I	will	use	“God”	as	the	term	is	broadly	understood	in	the	Jewish	and	Christian	traditions.	
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experience of evil makes the apparent hiddenness of God all the more apparent and 
distressing. For many faiths, a personal relationship with God is incredibly 
important, and not just for any soteriological role such a relationship might play but 
for general human flourishing. As such, when God seems hidden—particularly in 
times of acute suffering and pain—this can create a serious existential problem 
indeed. As Howard-Snyder and Moser explain, if God seems hidden to the people 
in these faith communities “the world appears as an uncaring, inhospitable place. 
Despair over life itself then, is a natural result of divine hiddenness” (2002, 2). 
While the existential problem of divine hiddenness is serious and broadly 
experienced, the philosophical literature has focused less on the existential angst 
posed by divine hiddenness and more on how the hiddenness of God poses a 
serious, evidential obstacle for theistic belief. In his seminal work, Divine 
Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993), John Schellenberg powerfully argued, in 
sum, that if God is perfectly loving, he would make it so that anyone capable of 
having a personal relationship with him would be able to reasonably believe that 
God exists. Given that some people do not believe in the existence of God—and 
after careful, sincere investigation and due to no fault of their own—then such a 
perfectly loving God does not exist. 
In this essay, along with most of the contemporary philosophical literature, we will 
focus on the problem of divine hiddenness as an argument against theistic belief, 
and not as an existential problem. (As such, hereafter whenever I refer to the 
problem of divine hiddenness, I’m referring to the evidential argument against 
theistic belief and not the existential problem.)  
§1: A Summary of the Argument 
As I mentioned above, John Schellenberg’s landmark book, Divine Hiddenness and 
Human Reason (1993), is the seminal work on the problem of divine hiddenness. 
As Daniel Howard-Snyder and Adam Green nicely summarize Schellenberg’s 
argument: 
(1) There are people who are capable of relating personally to God but who, 
through no fault of their own, fail to believe.  
(2) If there is a personal God who is unsurpassably great, then there are no 
such people. 
(3) So, there is no such God (from 1 and 2). (2016, sec. 2) 
Obviously, if a theist wants to maintain their theism—and reject the conclusion of 
that argument—they need to be able to viably reject one of the two premises. At 
first blush, the first premise seems entirely incontrovertible and innocuous. It seems 
perfectly clear that if someone was from a society or culture that was relatively 
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untouched by something like a traditional brand of theism, that they might live their 
entire lives without believing in God, due to no fault of their own. What is more, 
many atheists and agnostics seem to honestly and carefully consider the case for 
theism and don’t become theists; and it might seem like a rare case indeed to 
discover an atheist or agnostic who rejects theism out of an explicit hatred for God 
or religion in general. Indeed, it seems like it would be tantamount to intellectual 
arrogance if a theist concluded that an atheist or an agnostic was somehow 
epistemically or intellectually derelict simply because they aren’t theists. On what 
grounds could a theist challenge the intellectual integrity of every atheist and 
agnostic on this issue? As incontrovertible as this assumption seems to be it is 
nevertheless an assumption. Let’s call it the no-fault assumption. 
The second premise might seem a bit more suspect—or at least it doesn’t seem as 
overtly plausible as the first premise—and so this might be what a theist looking to 
maintain their theism might first consider rejecting. After all, why think that a 
personal God who is unsurpassingly great would preclude the possibility of 
someone both (i) being capable of having a personal relationship to God and (ii) 
nevertheless failing to believe in the existence of God due to no fault of their own? 
Daniel Howard-Snyder and Adam Green helpfully summarize Schellenberg’s 
argument for premise two (as it is found in his 1993 work): 
(2a) If there is a personal God who is unsurpassably great, then there is a 
personal God who is unsurpassably loving. 
(2b) If there is a personal God who is unsurpassably loving, then for any 
human person H and any time t, if H is at t capable of relating personally to 
God, H has it within H’s power at t to do so (i.e., will do so, just by 
choosing), unless H is culpably in a contrary position at t. 
(2c) For any human person H and any time t, H has it within H’s power at t 
to relate personally to God only if H at t believes that God exists. 
(2d) So, if there is a personal God who is unsurpassably great, then for any 
human person H and any time t, if H is at t capable of relating personally to 
God, H at t believes that God exists, unless H is culpably in a contrary 
position at t (from 2a through 2c).(2016, sec. 2) 
And insofar as this conclusion (2d) is mean to be, as Howard-Snyder and Green put 
it “tantamount to [the second premise] of the main argument,” this argument gives 
us a proof for the premise under consideration (2016, sec. 2). So if a theist wants to 
reject the second premise of the main argument (2) so as to maintain their theism, 
they will need to reject one of these premises that lead us to the conclusion of 2d. 
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Few traditional theists (or at least theists from the Judeo-Christian tradition) would 
want to deny that God is unsurpassingly great or that he is unsurpassingly loving. 
While there might be some question about what it means for God to be 
unsurpassingly loving, few theists would want to deny outright that God has this 
characteristic. Premise 2a seems fairly incontrovertible. 
Likewise, it would be difficult for a theist to reject premise 2c. It might seem pretty 
clear that someone can’t have a personal relationship with an agent or thing if they 
don’t think that agent or thing exists.2 Even in cases of non-existent imaginary 
friends, insofar as we’re willing to grant that someone could have a personal 
relationship with a non-existent imaginary friend, we would presumably require 
that at least that person believe that their imaginary friend exists. 
So that leaves the theist with premise 2b. Thankfully for the theist, there seems to 
be more room for disagreement here. That said, 2b certainly seems to enjoy some 
intuitive plausibility. While there is certainly a lot to say here, the basic idea is that 
if God is personal and unsurpassably loving—as we granted with premise 2a—then 
such a God would make it so that people who are capable of having a relationship 
with him would be able to do so. Of course, that won’t guarantee that everyone has 
a personal relationship with God—maybe due to rebellion or sin some people 
culpably resist. Given that being in a relationship with God is extremely desirable—
indeed, according to many theists, such a relationship is essential to human 
flourishing—we would reasonably expect a perfectly loving God to make it so that 
such a relationship is within everyone’s grasp. If God was perfectly loving, then, 
non-culpable non-belief would not exist.3 But once we grant this, then it is going to 
seem difficult to reject the conclusion at 2d and subsequently the conclusion at 3. 
Let’s call this the perfectly loving assumption. Of course a theist may respond—
indeed many theists do respond—by asking what exactly it means for God to be 
perfectly loving. If the case could be made that God could be perfectly loving 
without leading to the conclusion that non-culpable non-belief wouldn’t exist—
without entailing the idea that God would making his existence sufficiently 
manifest to everyone (or at least everyone capable of having a relationship with 
																																																								
2To	be	sure,	this	is	actually	a	point	of	contention:	As	Howard-Snyder	and	Green	ask,	“might	not	a	degree	of	confidence	below	the	threshold	of	belief,	or	acceptance,	or	imagination-based	assent,	or	belief-less	assuming,	or	trust,	or	even	hope	suffice?”	(2016,	§4).	See	Alston	1996;	Audi	2011;	Cohen	1992;	Howard-Snyder	2013;	McKaughan	2013;	Poston	and	Dougherty	2007;	Schellenberg	2009;	Schellenberg	2014	
3For	more	on	this,	see	pages	89-103	in	Schellenberg’s	The	Hiddenness	Argument:	Philosophy’s	
New	Challenge	to	Belief	in	God	(2015).	
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him)—then perhaps the conclusion of the Problem of divine hiddenness can be 
avoided.  
§2: Some Objections 
Perhaps the most prevalent strategy for rejecting the problem of divine hiddenness 
focuses on rejecting the perfectly loving assumption—the assumption that because 
God is perfectly loving he would make his existence sufficiently manifest to 
everyone (or at least everyone capable of having a relationship with him). In other 
words, many responses to the problem of divine hiddenness have tried to find a 
reason why a perfectly loving God would (either via comisson or omission) allow 
for situations where someone who is capable of a personal relationship with God 
nevertheless non-culpably fails to believe that God exists.4 Maybe sometimes God 
would allow for non-culpable non-belief of this sort because to make his existence 
manifestly clear (at least in some situations) would objectionably infringe upon a 
person’s moral autonomy (see Murray 2002 and Swinburne 1979). Or maybe 
sometimes God would allow for non-culpable non-belief of that sort because 
beholding God’s perfection and glory would make certain people (at certain times) 
jealous and resentful (see Dumsday 2012). Or maybe sometimes God allows for 
non-culpable non-belief of that sort in someone because they’re interested in having 
a relationship with God for the wrong reasons (see Dumsday 2014; Moser 2002, 
2008). If we could find reasons like these that a perfectly loving God might have 
for being hidden from people who would otherwise be capable of a relationship 
with God, then we might be able to find ways to reject the perfectly loving 
assumption and resist the problem of divine hiddenness’s conclusion.5 
And it’s worth noting that such philosophical responses potentially have theological 
support—though such arguments don’t rest on this support. For example, in 
Romans 9, the Apostle Paul controversially seems to give a picture of God where 
God chooses to have a salvific relationship with some while also choosing to 
withhold that relationship with others. For many, this is a troubling passage, and a 
tremendous amount of theological energy has been spent trying to unpack and 
exegete it. And while such exegesis is beyond the scope of this chapter, such 
passages could arguably serve as grounds for rejecting the second premise of 																																																								
4For	an	excellent	list	and	summary	of	responses	like	this	see	Howard-Snyder	and	Green	(2016)	§3.	
5Or	maybe	the	perfectly	loving	assumption	is	misguided	because	God	is	transcendent	and	somehow	beyond	our	understanding	of	love	(or	personal	in	a	personal	relationship).	See	Rea	2016;	Ross	2002;	Trakakis	2016.		Or	maybe	we	could	make	the	case	that	there	could	be	reasons	for	God	to	hide	himself	from	some	people,	but	we	simply	don’t	know	them.	See	Howard-Snyder	2016	and	McBrayer	and	Swenson	2012.		
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problem of divine hiddenness we saw in the previous section. They can be used to 
motivate rejecting the idea that God must be perfectly loving in such a way that 
would entail that he would make it so that anyone capable of having a personal 
relationship with him would be able to reasonably believe that God exists. Perhaps 
God has good reasons—or perhaps it is a part of his sovereign plan—for hiding 
himself from some people while revealing himself to others. 
Other Biblical passages arguably lend credence to such a possibility. There are 
places in the book of Exodus where God explicitly seems to “harden the heart” of 
Pharaoh (see Exodus 4:21; 7:3; 9:12; 10:1; 10:20; 10:27; 11:10; 14:4;14:8). 
Similarly, in 1 Kings 22:19-23, God explicitly sends a “lying spirit” to deceive 
Ahab, the King of Israel, which eventually leads to his destruction. And given that 
having a “hardened heart” or a “lying spirit” seems to preclude having a healthy, 
personal relationship with God, then God doesn’t seem to necessarily want to have 
a relationship with everyone, contra the perfectly loving assumption. And if God 
doesn’t want a relationship with everyone then either he’s not truly perfectly loving 
or being perfectly loving somehow doesn’t entail wanting a relationship with 
everyone. In either case, there’s arguably scriptural precedent for rejecting the 
second premise of the evidential problem of divine hiddenness. 
Another strategy for responding to the problem of divine hiddenness is rejecting 
what seems like the far more incontrovertible and innocuous assumption, the no-
fault assumption. While this particular response has not enjoyed as much focused 
attention in the philosophical literature, it’s worth mentioning at least briefly 
because certain religious communities might have theological or scriptural reasons 
for rejecting the no-fault assumption. 
Paul’s letter to the Romans again could arguably give someone material for 
rejecting what initially seems like a plausible assumption: that someone could be 
epistemically non-culpable in non-belief, be it atheism or agnosticism. In Romans 
1:18-21, Paul seems to reject that assumption, implying that the existence of God 
has “been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that 
have been made. So [that people who have suppressed the truth] are without 
excuse.” And again, this isn’t an isolated passage; other Biblical passages seem to 
point to similar conclusions. The writers of the Psalms seem to routinely find clear 
evidence for God in creation (see, for example, Psalm 19 and Psalm 148), and we 
see similar sentiment repeated elsewhere in the Old Testament (see, for example, 
Job 12 and Isaiah 55). Within the Jewish and Christian traditions, there seems to be 
an assumption that the presence of God is sufficiently manifest in the world. And as 
such, a theist from such a tradition could plausibly reject the first premise of the 
argument from divine hiddenness noted above. 
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Both of these responses to divine hiddenness—the rejection of the assumption that 
God, being perfectly loving, wants a relationship with everyone and the rejection of 
the idea that non-belief can be non-culpable—face their own rejoinders. First of all, 
if we reject the idea that God is perfectly loving or the idea that being perfectly 
loving somehow entails wanting a relationship with everyone, then there is a real 
worry that we’ll be left with a God who purposefully hides himself from some 
people—making a personal relationship with God extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for those people. And if we think that having such a relationship with 
God is critically important for human flourishing—and depending on one’s 
theological bent, singularly essential for one’s eternal salvation—a God who 
willingly hides himself from some people seems, at least to many people, morally 
repugnant.6  
Alternatively, if we reject the plausible assumption that someone can non-culpably 
reject theism (in the form of atheism or agnosticism)—the assumption that someone 
can carefully and honestly consider the evidence for theism and nevertheless remain 
agnostic or atheistic—then other worries need to be addressed. If two intellectual 
peers—interlocutors who are equally intelligent, informed, and educated—disagree 
about a particular issue, it would seem intellectually arrogant for one of them to 
simply dismiss out of hand the other’s disagreement as disingenuous or the product 
of faulty (or sinful) cognitive faculties. That’s not how productive, honest 
disagreements are suppose to work. As such, if a theist were to reject the problem 
of divine hiddenness on the grounds that atheism or agnosticism are the result of the 
noetic effects of sin or some cognitive malfunction, then the debate seems to grind 
to a halt. The theist, when employing such a strategy, seems antagonistic, 
unfriendly, and belligerent—leaving little common ground between theists and non-
theists. 
Conclusion  
In summary, then, according to the evidential problem of divine hiddenness if God 
is perfectly loving, he would make it so that anyone capable of having a personal 
relationship with him would be able to reasonably believe that God exists. Given 
that some people do not believe in the existence of God—and after careful, sincere 
investigation and due to no fault of their own—then such a perfectly loving God 
does not exist. As we saw, however, such an argument rests on two key 
assumptions: the perfectly loving assumption, the assumption that because God is 																																																								
6To	be	sure,	however,	it’s	worth	noting	that	many	theological	traditions	don’t	find	such	a	view	morally	repugnant	at	all.	The	Calvinism	of	various	strains	of	Protestantism	is	a	great	example	of	such	a	tradition.	
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perfectly loving he would make his existence sufficiently manifest to everyone (or 
at least everyone capable of having a relationship with him); and the no-fault 
assumption, the assumption that someone can sincerely and honestly consider the 
question as to whether or not God exists and non-culpably maintain non-theistic 
belief (agnosticism or atheism).   
Both assumptions can be rejected so as to avoid the problem of divine hiddenness’s 
conclusion; however, doing so comes with challenges. If we are going to try to 
reject to the conclusion of the problem of divine hiddenness by denying the 
perfectly loving assumption, then special care needs to be taken to describe how 
God might be perfectly loving and yet purposefully hide himself from some people 
in certain circumstances or contexts. Alternatively, if we are going to try to reject 
the conclusion of the problem of divine hiddenness by denying the no-fault 
assumption, then it seems like special care needs to be taken to explain away non-
belief in a friendlier way—in a way that doesn’t hide a blind arrogance or 
dogmatism.  
Happily, the philosophical debate continues to develop.7 John Schellenberg among 
many others continue to refine and strengthen the problem—making it all the more 
problematic for theists!  And research continues to develop that might help explain 
what it means for God to be perfectly loving and why God might sometimes be 
hidden for good reasons. Other theorists are developing new (and far more friendly) 
ways to explain non-belief (i.e. agnosticism and atheism), and others are exploring 
how unfriendly approaches might yet be correct.8   
Summary:  
In this chapter:  
• We distinguished the existential problem of divine hiddenness from the 
evidential problem of divine hiddenness. The former being primarily 
concerned with the apparent hiddenness of a personal God in the lives of 																																																								
7	And	some	of	this	development	draws	from	exciting	new	resources.	In	“No-fault	Atheism”	(2016),	John	Greco	draws	from	contemporary	research	in	social	epistemology	to	give	a	
friendly	explanation	for	theistic	non-belief.	And	the	growing	field	of	cognitive	science	of	religion	is	also	providing	conceptual	and	empirical	resources	for	explaining	why	some	people	have	theistic	beliefs	while	others	don’t.	See	Justin	Barrett’s	seminal	work,	Why	Would	Anyone	
Believe	in	God?	(2004).			
8	Research	in	this	chapter	was	made	possible	thanks	to	a	generous	grant	from	the	John	Templeton	Foundation.	I	dedicate	this	work	to	my	beloved	unborn	child,	Amias	Noah	Church,	who	we	lost	at	the	start	of	2017,	and	who	brought	the	hiddenness	of	God	painfully	to	bear	in	my	life.	
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believers amidst terrible suffering. The latter being primarily concerned with 
the apparent hiddenness of God being evidence against God’s existence.  
• In the first section, we highlighted the basic contours of the evidential 
problem of divine hiddenness, and suggested that the argument rests on two 
important assumptions: the perfectly loving assumption and the no-fault 
assumption.  
• In the second section, a few possible responses to the evidential problem of 
divine hiddenness were considered, which center on rejecting either the 
perfectly loving assumption or the no-fault assumption.  
 
Study Questions: 
1) If God is supposed to be perfectly loving, then should we expect him to 
sufficiently reveal himself to all rational agents capable of having a 
relationship with him? Why or why not?  
2) What role can religious texts (e.g. the Bible) play in generating a 
philosophical response to the problem of divine hiddenness?  
3) What relationship do you think the existential problem of divine hiddenness 
bears to the evidential problem of divine hiddenness?  
4) How might the rejection of the no-fault assumption be perceived as 
intellectual arrogance? Does a commitment to intellectual humility commit 
us to the no-fault assumption?  
5) Is there a viable, friendly way to reject the no-fault assumption?  
6) Contemporary research in cognitive science of religion is making great 
strides in helping us empirically understand why some people have religious 
beliefs and others don’t. How might this research be brought to bear to the 
problem of divine hiddenness?  
7) Our religious beliefs (or lack thereof) are often shaped by our families, 
communities, and cultures. How might a better understanding of such 
influences be brought to bear on the problem of divine hiddenness?  
Suggested Introductory Readings  
• Barrett, Justin L. 2004. Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Walnut Creek, 
CA: AltaMira Press. [While not directly about the problem of divine 
hiddenness, this book brings together a lot of relevant empirical research 
into religious belief and non-belief.] 
• Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Paul K. Moser. 2002. “Introduction: The 
Hiddenness of God.” In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Daniel 
Howard-Snyder; Paul K. Moser. Cambridge University Press. [This is the 
introduction to the Howard-Snyer and Moser’s edited collection on divine 
	 10	
hiddenness, and it does an excellent job summarizing the relevant issues and 
debates.] 
• Schellenberg, J. L. 1993. Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. [This is arguably the seminal work that established 
the problem of divine hiddenness in the philosophical literature.] 
• Garcia, Laura L. 2002. “St. John of the Cross and the Necessity of Divine 
Hiddenness.” In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Daniel Howard-
Snyder and Paul K. Moser, 83–97. Cambridge University Press. [An 
excellent introduction to the existential problem of divine hiddenness; 
although not the main focus of this chapter, this is an incredibly important 
variant of the problem of divine hiddenness.] 
 
Suggested Advanced Readings (3-5) 
• Green, Adam, and Eleonore Stump, eds. (2016) Hidden Divinity and 
Religious Belief: New Perspectives. Cambridge, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press. [This book contains an excellent collection of 
leading, contemporary research on the problem of divine hiddenness and 
proposed solutions.] 
• Schellenberg, J. L. 2015. The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New 
Challenge to Belief in God. 1 edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[Schellenberg is the seminal figure within the divine hiddenness literature. 
This book showcases some of his most developed work on the issue.] 
• Audi, Robert. 2011. Rationality and Religious Commitment. Oxford 
University Press. [In this chapter, I have assumed a very simple view of 
religious belief and commitment. That said, however, how we view religious 
faith and belief can have a substantial impact on how we perceive the 
problem of divine hiddenness. This book allows the reader to explore the 
rationality of religious belief and the nature of religious commitments in 
much greater detail.]  
 
Free Online Resources  
• Anon. 2017. “Argument from Nonbelief.” Wikipedia. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Argument_from_nonbelief
&oldid=763750944. [The Wikipedia page for the problem of divine 
hiddenness, which gives an excellent, basic overview of the argument 
and some possible objections to it.] 
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• Howard-Snyder, Adam, Daniel; Green. 2016. “Hiddenness of God.” The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-hiddenness/. [An excellent online 
introduction the problem of divine hiddenness—especially the evidential 
problem—and the relevant philosophical literature] 
• Kraay, Klaas J. 2017. “The Problem of Divine Hiddenness - Philosophy 
- Oxford Bibliographies.” Oxford Bibliographies. 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-
9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0178.xml. [An excellent 
annotated bibliography on the problem of divine hiddenness; it 
summarizes the problem and the contours of the literature and points 
readers to other great resources.] 
 
Glossary of Key Terms 
Existential Problem of  Divine Hiddenness: The angst generated by (i) the 
belief that a personal relationship with God is incredibly important for 
general human flourishing and (ii) the perception of God as hidden or 
silent—potentially resulting in a view of the world as uncaring and/or 
inhospitable.  
Evidential  Problem of Divine Hiddenness: An argument against the 
existence of God. In sum, if God is perfectly loving, he would make it so 
that anyone capable of having a personal relationship with him would be 
able to reasonably believe that God exists. Given that some such people do 
not believe in the existence of God, then such a perfectly loving God does 
not exist. 
John Schellenberg: The leading figure in the divine hiddenness literature. 
His 1993 book, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, is often pointed to 
as the seminal work on the subject.   
No-fault Assumption: the assumption that someone can sincerely and 
honestly consider the question as to whether or not God exists and non-
culpably maintain non-theistic belief (agnosticism or atheism).   
Non-Belief: Abstaining from theistic belief; atheism or agnosticism 
regarding the existence of God. 
Non-Culpable: Not subject to blame. If someone was non-culpable in their 
atheistic or agnostic belief regarding the existence of God, then that means 
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that they cannot be blamed for their belief (or lack of belief)—that they have 
sincerely and honestly looked into the issue and made the best decision with 
the evidence they had.  
Perfectly-loving Assumption: the assumption that because God is perfectly 
loving he would make his existence sufficiently manifest to everyone or at 
least everyone capable of having a relationship with him. 
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